#Carrier command 2 cruise missile series

In the late 1980s, there were only two ASCMs capable of being launched from a submarine torpedo tube, the French SM39 Exocet and the U.S. This certainly alleviated many complicated submarine design issues, but this choice had problems of its own.

A submerged launch option had to be developed to enable the submarine to remain stealthy until it was time to fire, as well as giving it a chance of escape after launching its attack.įor reasons that haven’t been revealed, the Chinese chose a torpedo tube launched approach rather than the external tubes popular with Soviet submarines. That’s an uncomfortably long time for a submarine to be on the surface, exposed, that close to a hostile surface ship. According to one Chinese article, the six missiles could be launched in six to seven minutes after the submarine had surfaced. With a range of only 42 km (22.7 nm), the submarine would be highly susceptible to detection by radar and engaged before it could get all its missiles off. The new Type 033G submarine began test-firing trials in 1985, and while the launch system appears to have functioned adequately, there was one fatal flaw that effectively ended further development – the submarine had to surface to fire. In the fall of 1983, the PLAN accepted delivery of a modified Type 033 Romeo class submarine with six external missile tubes for launching the YJ-8. Their first effort, however, was somewhat half-hearted. The small, solid rocket-fueled YJ-8 was exactly what the PLAN was looking for. The Styx-based missiles were far too big, and there were significant safety concerns with putting volatile liquid-fueled missiles on submarines. But it wasn’t until the YJ-8 program got started that they finally had a weapon they could work with. Since the late 1970s, the PLAN had eagerly sought to develop a submarine-launched ASCM. And while this is consistent with current PLAN practice (see the YJ-83 discussion) it either wasn’t accepted practice early on, or the policy wasn’t followed for this particular missile as the pictures in Figure 5 clearly illustrate. A knowledgeable outside source, which knew the proper designator for the ship version, merely added the “K” to distinguish the missile as an aircraft weapon. The YJ-8K designator that has often been used is incorrect, but it is an understandable mistake. Iran purchased the C801K and began receiving shipments in the mid-1990s. The “K” reportedly means “Kongjun” or air force, indicating an aircraft launched missile. The YJ-81 is reported to have begun flight-testing in the mid-1980s, and reached IOC in 1989. The small size and low weight of the YJ-81 provided smaller tactical aircraft in the PLAN inventory with a standoff anti-ship strike capability for the first time. Like the YJ-8 it has fixed wings, but there is a faired boattail cap over the rocket exhaust to help reduce the missile’s drag when carried on an aircraft’s pylon.

The shorter section aft of the wings, lack of a scoop, and an underbelly cable run, identify this as a rocket-propelled missile. The YJ-81 is very similar to the YJ-8, but without the booster (see Figure 5). The PLAN’s keen desire for an air-launched version of the YJ-8 drove a near simultaneous development and test program alongside the ship-launched missile. In Part 1 of this three-part series, designation confusion, as well as the first two members of the family – the YJ-8 and YJ-8A – were covered.

#Carrier command 2 cruise missile series

The purpose of this series of articles is to conduct a critical review of the available evidence to sort out the correct identity of the members of this missile family, as well as providing accurate characteristics and performance data. One especially troublesome example is the inadequate reporting on China’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), and more specifically the Ying Ji-8 (YJ-8) or Eagle Strike-Eight anti-ship cruise missile family. Unfortunately, the confusing and often-inaccurate information on the technical aspects of China’s armed forces, and in this particular case the PLAN, makes meaningful debate difficult.

With the growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the first carrier landings aboard the Liaoning (China’s first aircraft carrier), and the arguments over disputed islands and reefs in the South and East China Seas getting louder and louder, it is only natural there would be increased media coverage on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military capabilities.